MemoMemorandumTrump 45 · R Quiet signal

Presidential Memorandum

Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World Trade Organization

This memorandum directs the U.S. Trade Representative to push for WTO reforms to stop self-declared developing countries—particularly advanced economies like China—from receiving unjustified special trade flexibilities. If insufficient progress occurs within 90 days, the USTR must stop treating such countries as developing countries for WTO purposes and may oppose their OECD membership, while also publishing a list of targeted countries.

Impact dates

  1. USTR determination whether substantial progress made toward WTO changes; if not, trigger for ending developing-country treatment and OECD opposition

  2. USTR update to President on progress toward WTO changes

Key directives

  • USTR shall use all available means to secure WTO changes preventing unjustified developing-country flexibilities
  • USTR shall update President within 60 days on progress
  • If no substantial progress within 90 days, USTR shall no longer treat improperly self-declared developing countries as developing countries for WTO purposes
  • If no substantial progress within 90 days, USTR shall not support OECD membership for such countries where relevant
  • USTR shall publish website list of self-declared developing countries inappropriately seeking flexibilities
  • Before acting under Section 3(a), USTR must consult Trade Policy Committee, National Security Council, and National Economic Council

Who is ordered

Timeline

Immediate

  • USTR directed to use all available means to secure WTO changes on developing-country flexibilities

Near term (90d)

  • USTR must update President within 60 days on progress
  • USTR must determine whether substantial progress achieved by day 90; if not, must stop treating certain countries as developing countries for WTO purposes, consider opposing OECD membership, and publish list of targeted countries

Long term

  • Potential structural shift in WTO developing-country framework
  • Bilateral and multilateral trade relationship adjustments with targeted countries

Risks & tensions

  • Potential WTO dispute challenges if USTR unilaterally withholds developing-country recognition
  • Escalation risk with China given explicit targeting and ongoing trade tensions in 2019
  • Fracturing of WTO coalition dynamics if other members resist U.S.-driven reform
  • Consultation requirements with Trade Policy Committee, NSC, and NEC create procedural friction that may delay or moderate action
  • Vague 'substantial progress' standard gives USTR discretion but creates uncertainty about trigger
Presidential Memorandum: Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World Trade Organization · Executive Orders