Federal Emergency Management Agency assistance in emergency preparedness planning at commercial nuclear power plants

Impact dates

1. Feb 16, 1989

   FEMA must issue interim directives and procedures

2. Nov 18, 1988

   Effective date of Executive Order; immediate review of regulations and interagency agreements required

Key directives

• FEMA authorized to prepare radiological emergency plans when state/local governments decline or fail to (Section 1)
• Licensee must certify in writing to FEMA that state/local failure exists (Section 1(b))
• FEMA must make maximum feasible use of licensee resources before using federal resources (Section 2(b)(1))
• FEMA must not supplant state/local resources; substitute only as last resort after consultation (Section 2(b)(2))
• Interagency MOUs require OMB approval and Federal Register publication (Section 2(b)(3))
• OMB resolves federal funding obligation issues (Section 2(c))
• Full reimbursement to federal government required to extent permitted by law (Section 2(c)(4), 6(d))
• FEMA must plan for federal assumption of all necessary protective functions (Section 3(b))
• FEMA must evaluate plans as if drafted by state/local government (Section 4(a))
• FEMA may assume command-and-control function if no competent state/local authority available (Section 5(c))
• FEMA authorized to accept volunteer assistance from utility employees and nongovernmental personnel (Section 5(d))
• FEMA to issue interim directives within 90 days and final directives within 180 days (Section 6(a))

Who is ordered

• Director of FEMA · FEMA
• Director of OMB · Office of Management and Budget

Timeline

Risks & tensions

• Tension between federal substitution and state sovereignty: EO creates federal backstop but explicitly frames state/local non-participation as exceptional, requiring 'last resort' treatment
• Reimbursement mechanism (Section 6(d)) may create political friction with non-participating states/localities and licensees over cost allocation
• Command-and-control federal assumption (Section 5(c)) risks constitutional federalism concerns during actual emergencies, though framed as contingent
• Vague standard: 'maximum feasible use' and 'adequate participation' leave significant discretion to FEMA and OMB in implementation
• Judicial review bar (Section 8) limits enforceability for affected parties; nuclear plant operators and nearby residents have no private right of action